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DR. STRANGE DRUG, OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP
WORRYING AND LOVE AUTHORIZED GENERICS
John M Rebman*
INTRODUCTION
An "authorized generic" is chemically identical to the brand-name drug
product, but authorized by the brand-name manufacturer to be
marketed in a generic version.1 The brand-name manufacturer either
sells the authorized generic through a subsidiary or licenses it to
another independent generic company.2  The practice has generated
considerable debate within the pharmaceutical industry and drawn the
attention of Congress and government regulators.
The controversy stems from certain provisions of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 3 more
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, which regulates the entry
and approval of both brand-name and generic pharmaceuticals. One of
the primary purposes of the Act is to encourage generic entry into the
market after patent expiration and through patent validity challenges.4
Under certain circumstances, the first generic entrant is awarded a 180-
day marketing exclusivity period as an economic reward.5 Because the
authorized generic ordinarily enters the market during this exclusivity
period, controversy has arisen concerning the legality and competitive
effects of the new market entrant.
Proponents argue that authorized generics are a legal practice
that benefits consumers with increased competition. 6 The argument
* JD Candidate, St. Louis University School of Law, 2009; B.E. Chemical
Engineering and Mathematics, Vanderbilt University, 2004.
' Agency Information Collection Activities; Comment Request, 71 Fed. Reg. 16779,
16780 (Apr. 4, 2006).
2id.
3 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 35 U.S.C.). The Hatch-Waxman Act amended certain
provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
4 See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896, 901 (6th Cir. 2003).
' See 21 U.S.C.A § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (Supp. 2007). This period is exclusive in the
sense that no later generic applicant may enter the market; however, the brand-name
pharmaceutical remains in the market. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
See also infra note 35 and accompanying text (describing three other situations where
this exclusivity period is shared between generic manufacturers).
6 See Richard E. Coe and M. Howard Morse, Authorized Generics Are Good for You:
Competition from drug pioneers shouldn't trouble the FTC, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 10,
2006, at 37 ("There is little doubt that authorized generics benefit consumers by
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
stems from the fact that authorized generics increase competition in a
period of exclusivity, which may, in turn, lower the short-term prices of
the drugs. Opponents, however, argue that authorized generics exploit
loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman Act and likely violate antitrust laws.7
The critics, particularly the Generic Pharmaceutical Association
("GPhA"), further speculate that the sale of authorized generics during
the exclusivity period "reduces the value of the 180-day exclusivity"
and diminishes the incentives for generic entry.
8
The courts have thus far upheld the legality of the practice
under Hatch-Waxman; however, commentators and opponents of
authorized generics have suggested that the practice is anti-competitive
and harms consumer welfare.9 As a result, the critics have encouraged
driving down prices for generic drugs. They are legal under the current regulatory
scheme, and the suggestion that their introduction somehow violates antitrust law is
baseless.")
7 David A. Balto, We'll Sell Generics Too: Innovator drug makers are gaming the
regulatory system and harming competition, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 20, 2006, at 39.
8 See Letter from Kathleen Jaeger, President & CEO, Generic Pharmaceutical
Association, to Office of the Secretary, Federal Trade Commission 3 (June 27, 2006),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/genericdrugstudy3/062806gpha.pdf
[hereinafter GPhA I].
9 This article will only address the competitive and economic policy issues associated
with authorized generics and omit an antitrust analysis. By addressing the
competitive and economic policy issues, this article will, by necessity, provide an
antitrust policy analysis; however it will omit an analysis detailing how current
antitrust law does not prevent the use of authorized generics. There are many theories
under Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, as well as state law trade practices
claims, which could be brought to bear. See, e.g. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Procter & Gamble Co., Plaintiffs Sec. Amended Complaint, Case No. CGC-04-
429860 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2004) (alleging fraudulent business practices violations);
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 686 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
(alleging antitrust violations and tortious interference); Eon Labs Mfg., Inc. v. Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (alleging violations of
the Sherman Act, Lanham Act, and state deceptive practices statute); Thomas Chen,
Authorized Generics: A Prescription for Hatch- Waxman Reform, 93 VA. L. REv. 459,
471-502 (2007). Antitrust law, however, recognizes that price competition benefits
consumers and has restricted competitor's ability to make predatory pricing claims
when the goods are sold above cost. See Coe & Morse, supra note 6 at 1. The
allegation that the mere introduction of a product can be predatory has long been
rejected. Id. FTC Commissioner Jon has publicly stated that he is not persuaded by
the arguments that authorized generics violate antitrust laws. Jon Leibowitz,
Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Health Care and the FTC: The Agency as Prosecutor
and Policy Wonk, Remarks at the Antitrust in HealthCare Conference (May 12, 2005)
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/050512healthcare.pdf. For a
further criticism of the antitrust allegations, see Mike Cowie and Melissa K. Jensen,
Misguided Attempts to Restrict Competition From Authorized Generics Drugs,
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Congress to propose legislation and for the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") to investigate the competitive effects of authorized generics.
This Comment provides a detailed analysis of the FTC study
and economic policy issues associated with authorized generics and the
likely impact of previously proposed legislation and other offered
"solutions." Part I briefly describes the procedural aspects of the drug
approval process and the relevant provisions and history of the Hatch-
Waxman Act. Part II provides a detailed discussion of the practice of
authorized generics and analyzes the differing views of the legality of
the practice under recent case law. Part III addresses the FTC's recent
announcement to investigate the economic impact of authorized
generics. Part III specifically addresses the goals of the FTC study and
the views of both the generic and brand-name manufacturers. Part IV
provides an economic analysis of the short-term and long-term effects
of authorized generics to demonstrate the likely outcome of the FTC
study. This section argues that authorized generics ultimately benefit
consumers with lower prices during the 180-day exclusivity period and
that significant incentives remain for generic manufacturers to enter the
market, regardless of exclusivity. Finally, Part V draws on the pro-
competitive nature of the practice of authorized generics and the
benefits received by consumers to demonstrate the unintended
consequences that will result from any prohibition of the practice.
I. THE HATCH-WAXMAN BACKGROUND AND
FRAMEWORK
A. The Previous Framework under the Original Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act
The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") is the governing
body responsible for regulation of pharmaceutical manufacturing and
approval to ensure public health and safety.10 In order for a new drug
to be approved by the FDA, the manufacturer must demonstrate that the
pharmaceutical product is safe and effective.11 To achieve this end,
Congress passed the 1962 Amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and
HEALTH LAWYERS NEWS, July 2007, at 6-10 and John Roberti, Authorized Generics:
The Federal Trade Commission to Weigh in on Healthcare Competition Controversy,
20 ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRONICLE 4, 20-23 (July 2006).
10 United States Food and Drug Administration Mission Statement,
http://www.fda.gov/comments/regs.html.
11 Id.
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Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA"), which requires the FDA to positively
determine that a drug is safe before it enters commercial distribution
and to consider whether new drugs are effective for the purposes for
which they are intended. 12
A pharmaceutical manufacturer seeking to market a new drug
that has not been approved by the FDA is required by the FFDCA to
submit a New Drug Application ("NDA"). 13  Typically, these
applications are very lengthy and detailed. Among the requirements,
the NDAs must include a full investigative report regarding the drug's
safety and effectiveness, detailed description about the method and
composition of the drug, and pertinent information about any patents
which claims the drug under the NDA.14 Specifically, the application
must contain "the patent number and the expiration date of any patent
which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted the application
or which claims a method of using such drug and with respect to which
a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person
not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of
the drug."15
The 1962 Amendments contained no separate provisions for
approval of generic versions that were identical to previously approved
drugs. 16 As a result, if a drug manufacturer wished to make a generic
version of a brand-name drug, the generic manufacturer was forced to
file its own NDA and demonstrate the safety and efficacy of the drug. 17
The generic drug manufacturers were thus required to prove that the
drug was safe and effective, even though the generic version was
chemically identical to the previously approved brand-name drug.
Additionally, a generic manufacturer possibly risked infringing the
brand-name manufacturer by conducting clinical testing prior to the
brand-name's patent expiration. 18  The separate approval process
12 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780, 784 (1962) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
"3 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b)(1) (Supp. 2007).
14 id.
15 Id.
16 Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They
Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 396 (1999).
'7 See id at 396-97.
18 See 35 U.S.C.A § 271 (Supp. 2007); Chen, supra note 9, 465. But see, Engelberg,
supra note 17, at 396 (arguing that "it was not an act of patent infringement to make
or use a patented drug solely for the purpose of seeking approval to market a generic
copy of the patented drug").
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proved to be unnecessary, duplicative, and expensive for the generic
manufacturers. 1
9
The brand-name manufacturers also faced difficulties under the
1962 Amendments. Because brand-name manufacturers often obtained
patents years prior to FDA approval of the drug, the effective patent
20term of the drug was shortened due to the lengthy approval process.
As a result, it was more difficult for the brand-name manufacturers to
recoup the significant investments made for research and development.
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act
In response to the concerns of both the brand-name and generic
manufacturers, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act. The Act has
been described as an effort "to balance two conflicting policy
objectives: to induce brand-name pharmaceutical firms to make
investments necessary to research and develop new drug products,
while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic
copies of those drugs to market."'', In other words, the Hatch-Waxman
Act was designed as a compromise to appease the conflicting
viewpoints of the brand-name and generic manufacturers, striking a
delicate balance.
The new framework created an efficient generic approval
process to bring generic drugs to the market more quickly and increase
consumer access to affordable medications. The new generic proposal
known as an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") requires a
generic manufacturer to demonstrate only that its drug is the
"bioequivalent" of the previously approved brand-name drug.2 2 Thus,
the ANDA applicant is no longer required to perform the duplicative
and costly safety approval procedure previously required.
Additionally, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, an ANDA applicant is
19 Jonathan M. Lave, The Generic Approval Process, 5 J. PHARMACY & LAw 275,
276.
20 See Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An
FTC Study, July 2002, at 4, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07lgenericdrugstudy.pdf [hereinafter FTC Study].
21 Abbott Labs v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting
on other grounds) (citations omitted).
22 See 21 U.S.C.A § 355(j) (Supp. 2007). Bioequivalence is met if the rate and extent
of absorption of the generic drug is not significantly different from the rate and extent
of absorption of the Orange Book-listed drug when administered at the same dosage.
FTC Study, supra note 20, at 5.
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able to perform the preliminary application steps without fear of a
potential patent infringement action.
23
The Hatch-Waxman Act also provided brand-name
manufacturers with certain favorable provisions to counter the benefits
to the generic manufacturers. As noted above, the delay in the FDA
approval process essentially decreased the term of the patent and made
it difficult for brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers to recoup the
significant cost of research and development. To offset any delays
caused by the NDA regulatory review process and increase the
effective time available to recoup investments, the Hatch-Waxman Act
provides for an extension of patent terms.24
In addition to being the holder of an FDA-approved NDA, the
brand-name manufacturer typically owns patents directed towards that
particular drug.25  Upon approval of the NDA, the FDA lists these
patents in a publication entitled "Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations," which is commonly referred to
as the "Orange Book.",26 The Hatch-Waxman Act provides a unique,
specialized procedure for generic manufacturers wishing to produce a
brand-name's Orange Book-listed pharmaceutical. The ANDA
applicant must reference each of the Orange Book-listed patents and
certify one of the following for each patent: (i) the brand-named firm
has not filed any patent information; (ii) the patent has already expired;
(iii) the generic manufacturer will not market the drug until after the
23 See 35 U.S.C.A § 271(e)(1) (Supp. 2007) ("It shall not be an act of infringement to
make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United
States a patented invention.., solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.").
24 See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (Supp. 2007).
25 Patents provide their owner with the ability to exclude others from making, using,
selling, offering to sell or importing the patented invention into United States. 35
U.S.C.A § 271(a) (Supp. 2007). While generally the term of the patent is twenty years
after the patent filing date, 35 U.S.C.A § 154 (Supp. 2007), pharmaceutical patents
may be extended in order to compensate for a portion of the patent term that was lost
during the FDA approval procedures. 35 U.S.C.A § 156 (Supp. 2007); see supra note
24 and accompanying text. Patent owners are permitted to file a civil suit in federal
court to enjoin infringers and obtain monetary damages. 35 U.S.C.A § 281 (Supp.
2007). Although issued patents enjoy a presumption of validity, accused infringers
may assert that the patent is invalid or not infringed. 35 U.S.C.A § 282 (Supp. 2007).
See also, John R. Thomas, Authorized Generic Pharmaceuticals: Effects on
Innovation, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, at 4 n. 21 (Aug. 8, 2006)
26 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(7)(A) (Supp. 2007); see also Jacob S. Wharton, "Orange
Book" Listings of Patents Under the Hatch- Waxman Act, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1027,
1030 (2003).
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patent expires; (iv) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is
submitted.27 These are commonly referred to as Paragraph I, 11, 111, and
IV certifications, respectively.
The determination of the effective approval date of an ANDA
application depends on the type of certification filed. Both Paragraph I
and II ANDA certifications meeting the necessary scientific and
regulatory requirements receive immediate effective approval. 28 An
ANDA certification filed under a Paragraph III application may not be
approved until after the brand-name's patent expires. 29 The Paragraph
IV certification, however, is a much more difficult approval process,
whereby a court must determine issues of the validity and/or
infringement of the brand-name patent.
30
Generic manufacturers filing a paragraph IV ANDA
certification must give an opinion notice to the patentee 31 detailing the
factual and legal basis that the patent is invalid or will not be
infringed. 32 The patent owner then has forty-five days to file an action
for infringement, during which time the ANDA applicant is barred
from filing a declaratory judgment action. 33 If the patentee chooses to
file an action for infringement, an automatic thirty-month stay is
triggered which prevents the FDA from approving the ANDA until the
suit is resolved or the patent expires.34
If the generic manufacturer prevails in the infringement action,
they may launch their generic product with a 180-day marketing
exclusivity period, during which the FDA may not approve a
subsequent generic manufacturer's ANDA application for the same
2 21 U.S.C.A § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (Supp. 2007).
281Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(i).
29 Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii).
30 See id. at § 355()(5)(B)(iii).
31 As noted above, the patent directed towards the particular drug is typically held by
the brand-name manufacturer, the holder of an FDA-approved NDA.
32 See 21 U.S.C.A § 355(j)(2)(B) (Supp. 2007); see also Teva USA, Inc. v. Pfizer,
Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
33 See 21 U.S.C.A § 355()(5)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2007). Although the generic
manufacturer can perform the preliminary application and testing steps without fear
of infringement, see supra, note 23 and accompanying text, the Hatch-Waxman Act
provides that the filing of an ANDA is an act of infringement. See 35 U.S.C.A §
271 (e)(2)(A) (Supp. 2007). This "highly artificial act of infringement" was created to
enable a patentee to bring an action against the ANDA filer. Eli Lilly Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990).
3 21 U.S.C.A § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2007).
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drug product.35 This exclusivity period provides an economic incentive
for generic manufacturers to challenge and "design around" a brand-
name company's drug product patent. 36 This is an incentive to incur
the expenses involved in filing such an application, trying to create a
non-infringing version of the drug, and facing a likely patent
infringement lawsuit from the brand-name manufacturer. Under the
original Hatch-Waxman Act, the commencement of the 180-day
exclusivity period could be triggered by either the first commercial sale
of the generic drug by the ANDA filer or a court decision finding the
patent invalid or not infringed.37
In essence, the Hatch-Waxman Act was the result of
negotiations between brand-name and generic pharmaceutical
manufacturers. Generally speaking, it was implemented to increase
competition in the pharmaceutical marketplace, by providing incentives
to both generic and brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers. Certain
provisions encourage brand-name competition by rewarding the
innovative efforts of brand-name manufacturers. Other provisions, of
which exclusivity is but one, were enacted to increase generic
competition in the pharmaceutical marketplace, thereby providing
consumers with affordable access to drugs.
C. Medicare Modernization and Improvement Act
Congressional enactment of the Medicare Modernization and
Improvement Act of 200338 ("Medicare Act") implemented several
changes to the Hatch-Waxman framework. Of particular importance,
the Medicare Act allows for multiple ANDA applicants to share the
" Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Teva, 395 F.3d at 1328. While this period is referred to as
"exclusive", multiple or shared exclusivity between generic manufacturers can arise
in three situations:
1) multiple generic applicants submit ANDAs with paragraph IV
certifications to the same patent(s) on the same first day; 2) multiple
ANDA applicants submit ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications for
different dosage forms or strengths of the same innovator drug product;
and 3) multiple ANDA applicants submit ANDAs with paragraph IV
certifications to different listed patents for the same innovator drug
product.
Erika Lietzan and David E. Korn, Issues in the Interpretation of 180-Day Exclusivity,
62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 49, 54-55 (2007). See infra Section I.C. for a further
discussion of the first situation.
36 Teva, 395 F.3d at 1328 (citing FTC Study, supra note 21, at 57).
31 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2457-58 (2003).
31 Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
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180-day exclusivity period, under certain circumstances. 39 This Act
entitles "any first applicant" to the 180 days of exclusivity. 40 The
statute further defines "first applicant" as any applicant who, on the
first day on which a substantially complete application containing a
paragraph IV certification is submitted, did themselves submit a
substantially complete application with a paragraph IV certification.41
Thus, if multiple generic applicants file a "substantially complete"
application with a paragraph IV certification on the same day, each
applicant shares the 180-day exclusivity period.
II. AUTHORIZED GENERICS
A. The Practice of Authorized Generics
The FDA defines an authorized generic as "any marketing by an
NDA holder or authorized by an NDA holder, including through a
third-party distributor, of the drug product approved under the NDA in
a manner equivalent to the marketing practices of holders of an
approved ANDA for that drug." 42  Thus, authorized generics are
manufactured by the holder of an NDA and marketed through a
subsidiary or a licensing agreement with an affiliate rather than being
manufactured and marketed by an independent generic firm holding an
approved ANDA.
'9 See 21 U.S.C.A § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (Supp. 2007). Previously, ANDA applicants
would literally camp outside the FDA office in order to be the first generic applicant
to file after the brand-name exclusivity period. See FDA, Guidance For Industry:
180-Day Exclusivity When Multiple ANDAs Are Submitted on the Same Day (July,
2003), at 4 available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/5710fnl.pdf The FDA,
though, adopted a policy to allow for multiple first applicants, see id. at 1, which the
Medicare Act ultimately codified. The Medicare Act also provides a new, more
complex set of events that trigger the 180-day exclusivity period, see 21 U.S.C.A §
355(j)(5)(D) (Supp. 2007), places restrictions on brand-name manufacturers' thirty
month stay, see id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), and provides new remedies for generic
manufacturers "to obtain patent certainty," see id. at § 355(j)(5)(C) (allowing the
ANDA applicant to file a declaratory judgment action against the patentee if the
patentee does not bring an infringement action within the required forty-five days).
40 Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (emphasis added).
41 Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb).
42 Letter from William K. Hubbard, Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning,
Department of Health & Human Services, to Stuart A. Williams, Chief Legal Officer,
Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., and James N. Czaban, Heller Ehrman White &
McAuliffe LLP (July 2, 2004) at 2, n.2, available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/ulyO4/070704/04p-0261 -pdnOOO1 .pdf
[hereinafter FDA Ruling].
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In the early 1990s, many brand-name manufacturers created
subsidiaries to market their own generic copies upon expiration of the
patented brand-name drug. 43 However, due to lack of profitability, the
brand-name manufacturers abandoned the practice.44 In recent years,
though, authorized generics have reemerged. Beginning around 2003,
brand-manufactures starting licensing their drugs to the generic
companies; thus, reducing the expenses of starting a subsidiary and
allowing for a greater return of investment.45 Furthermore, generics
currently own a much larger share of the market than in the early 1990s
and the brand-name manufacturers entered the market to capture a
portion of this increased share.
46
This resurgence of "authorized generics" has created quite a
controversy in the pharmaceutical industry. Whereas previously the
authorized generics were launched upon patent expiration, now, the
brand-name manufacturers, mostly through licensing agreements,
generally launch the product during the 180-day exclusivity period,
subsequent to Paragraph TV challenges.47 Because the exclusivity
period only applies to ANDA applications containing Paragraph IV
certifications, the Hatch-Waxman Act does not bar authorized generics
issued under an NDA application from entering the market.48
Although, authorized generics are utilized in other less controversial
situations, the primary area of concern arises with authorized generics
during the exclusivity period.49 The opponents thus began to argue that
43 Milt Freudenheim, All About/Generic Pharmaceuticals; Now the Big Drug Makers
Are Imitating Their Imitators, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 20, 1992 at F5. Because these
generic copies were introduced after patent expiration, they competed with ANDA
applications containing paragraph III certifications. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
44 Sandra Levy, Why authorized generics are making a comeback, Drug Topics, Nov.
3, 2003 available at
http://www.drugtopics.com/drugtopics/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=1 11159.
45 Id.
46 id.
47 While authorized generics are primarily introduced during the exclusivity period, it
is important to note that authorized generics may also be introduced at a variety of
times and under differing circumstances. For example, they may be marketed after
the exclusivity period has run, after patent expiration, or even in situations where no
ratent was awarded.
Thomas, supra note 25, at 12.
49 See Letter from Jack Painter, Esq., on behalf of Prasco, LLC, to Office of the
Secretary, Federal Trade Commission 2 (June 2, 2006) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/genericdrugstudy3/060605prasco.pdf.
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authorized generics undermine the legislative intent of the exclusivity
period.
B. Recent Case Law - the FDA and Federal Courts Support
Authorized Generics
Over the past few years, generic manufacturers have challenged
the legality of the authorized generics before the FDA and the courts.
On July 2, 2004, the FDA rejected citizen petitions submitted by Mylan
Pharmaceuticals Inc. ("Mylan") and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
("Teva").5 ° In its petition, Mylan requested that the FDA prohibit the
marketing and distribution of authorized generics during the 180-day
exclusivity period.51 Teva asked that the FDA (1) require the NDA
holder to submit supplemental NDAs ("sNDAs") 52 if they wish to
market or distribute an authorized generic, and (2) delay approval of
these sNDAs until after the exclusivity period.5 3 The FDA did not find
either argument persuasive and in denying the requests found that it had
no authority to delay the entry of authorized generics; and even if did
have authority, the marketing of authorized generics "appears to
promote competition in the pharmaceutical marketplace, in furtherance
of a fundamental objective of the Hatch-Waxman amendments." 54
Subsequently, both Teva and Mylan filed suits against the FDA.
In Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries, Ltd. v. Crawford,55 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed with the FDA that
nothing in the Hatch-Waxman Act prohibits NDA holders from
marketing authorized generics during the exclusivity period.5 6 Generic
manufacturer Teva entered into an agreement with Purepac
Pharmaceutical Co. ("Purepac"), the first ANDA applicant to challenge
the patent for gabapentin, under which Purepac agreed to share the
50 FDA Ruling, supra note 42, at 1.
1 Id.
52 See 21 U.S.C.A § 356a (Supp. 2007) (describing the circumstances under which a
manufacturer is required to submit a supplemental application).
53 FDA Ruling, supra note 42, at 8. In essence, Teva's argument is identical to that of
Mylan, with the end result being that an NDA holder would be prohibited from
marketing or distributing authorized generics during the exclusivity period.
54 Id. at 2. The FDA also found that the Hatch-Waxman Act neither countenances
delaying entry of authorized generics nor prohibits an NDA holder's use of alternative
marketing practices. Id. at 3, 6.
55 Teva Pharm. Indus., Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
56 Id. at 53.
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exclusivity period with Teva.57 During the term of the agreement,
Pfizer sold its own "generic" version, which was priced substantially
below its brand-name version of the drug. 58 Because this was prior to
the enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act,59 Pfizer's "authorized
generic" competed directly under HMO formularies with Teva's drug
during the exclusivity period.6 °
After having the FDA's rejection of its citizen petition
confirmed by the district court, Teva appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit. The Court began by noting that the Hatch-
Waxman Act says nothing about the marketing practices of a NDA
holder.6' Furthermore, prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, "nothing in the
[Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic] Act prohibited the holder of an
approved NDA from marketing a 'brand-generic' version of its drug"
and the subsequent Hatch-Waxman Act said nothing about the
practice.
62
According to Teva, the practice of authorized generics could not
have been anticipated by Congress and thus a "functional"
interpretation was needed to preserve the statutory purpose.
6 3
Specifically, Teva argued that "adhering to the 'literal' terms of the
statute would lead to an absurd result, namely, that [the Hatch-Waxman
Act] grants only a 'meaningless' exclusivity against subsequent ANDA
filers rather than a 'commercially effective' exclusivity that runs
against the NDA holder as well.",
64
The Court, though, reasoned that the incentive to challenge
brand-name drug patents, namely the exclusivity period, is not without
limitation.65 Rather, Congress sought to "strike a balance between
incentives, on the one hand, for innovation, and on the other, for
quickly getting lower-cost generic drugs to market. ' 66 The means
chosen by Congress for this incentive to challenge patents, the Court
found, was unambiguous: "The FDA may not approve a second or later
ANDA... until 180 days after the first filer ... begins commercially
571 d. at 52.
58 Id. (internal quotes omitted).
59 See infra note 91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possible effects of
the Deficit Reduction Act on the practice of authorized generics.
60 Teva, 410 F.3d at 52.
61 Id. at 53.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 53-54.
6 Id. at 54.
65 Teva, 410 F.3d at 54.
66 .
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marketing the drug or wins a court decision against the patent
holder." 67 Thus, the practice of authorized generics does not render the
exclusivity period "meaningless." 68 The Court therefore affirmed the
FDA's interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act concerning authorized
generics.
69
In Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. FDA,70 the second and only
other authorized generics case to date, the Court similarly concluded
that Hatch-Waxman "does not grant the FDA the power to prohibit the
marketing of authorized generics during the 180-day exclusivity period
.... ,,71 After the FDA approved Mylan's Paragraph IV ANDA
application to sell a generic version of the brand name Macrobid,
Procter & Gamble, the brand name manufacturer, licensed a third party
to sell a competing generic version.72 According to Mylan, they lost
"tens of millions" of dollars as a result of the authorized generic. 73
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's and FDA's approval of authorized generics. In concluding that
the 180-day exclusivity period applied only with respect to other
Paragraph IV ANDA applicants, not authorized generics, the Fourth
Circuit followed and approvingly cited the rationale of the D.C.
Circuit. 74 The Court ultimately concluded "authorized generic[s] may
reduce the economic benefit of the 180 days of exclusivity awarded to
the first paragraph IV ANDA applicant, [but] § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) gives
no legal basis for the FDA to prohibit the encroachment of authorized
generics on that exclusivity.
'
"
75
Both these two decisions correctly decided that nothing in the
language of the Hatch-Waxman Act prohibits the practice of authorized
generics during the exclusivity period. The pharmaceutical
manufacturers were free to, and did, license authorized generics before
the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 76 and "Hatch-Waxman did
67 Id.
68 Id.; see also note 35 and Section I.C. a discussion of "shared exclusivity" between
multiple generic applicants under the Medicare Modernization and Improvement Act.
69 Id. at 55.
70 454 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2006).
" Id. at 271.
72 Id.
731 d. at 273.
74 Id at 275-76.
75 Mylan, 454 F.3d at 276.
76 See supra Section I-A for a historical discussion of the practice of authorized
generics.
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not purport to restrain that freedom." 77  Thus, if the practice of
authorized generics is to be prohibited, it must come through other
means, such as legislation or FTC enforcement actions. In its ruling,
however, the FDA found that the marketing of authorized generics
"furthers the Hatch-Waxman objective of enhancing competition
overall among drug products" and "is a long-standing, pro-competitive
practice .... 79
As a result of these decisions, much of the debate has turned on
economic policy, specifically the short-term versus long-term effects.
Generally speaking, the opponents argue that authorized generics deter
Paragraph IV entry in the long run, while the proponents assert that
authorized generics provide short-term competitive benefits, with no
long-term harms. Although some empirical studies exist, the FTC has
noted that there is no publicly available, comprehensive economic
study; thus, the FTC has proposed to undertake such a study.79  This
Note will discuss the information sought, as well as the concerns of the
FTC study. Doing so will shed light on the previous empirical studies
and demonstrate the positive competitive impact of authorized generics
on the pharmaceutical market.
III. THE FTC STUDY AND CONFLICTING VIEWPOINTS
As the FDA and courts have thus far upheld the legality of
authorized generics, the issue has become one of policy. Given the
possible implications on consumer health care costs, in May of 2005,
Senators Grassley, Leahy, and Rockefeller urged the FTC to study the
competitive effects of authorized generics. 80 The FTC responded by
announcing "a study of the use, and likely short- and long-term
competitive effects, of authorized generics in the prescription drug
marketplace." 81 The study will essentially attempt to determine the
extent, if any, to which the expectation of competition from authorized
generics during the exclusivity period decreases the entry of generic
17 Mylan, 454 F.3d at 276; Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries, Ltd. v. Crawford, 410
F.3d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
78 FDA Ruling, supra note 42, at 12-13.
79 First Notice, supra note 1, at 16780.
80 See Press Release, Grassley, Leahy, Rockefeller Request Study on Impact of
"Authorized" Generics (May 12, 2005),
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200505/051205b.html (reprinting Letter to Chairman
Deborah Platt Majoras, May 9, 2005).
81 Press Release, FTC Proposes Study of Competitive Impacts of Authorized Generic
Drugs (Mar. 29, 2006), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/03/authgenerics.shtm.
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drugs in the market and weigh this against any short-term benefits from
the increased competition-all in an effort to ultimately determine
whether authorized generics benefit or harm consumers.
There are primarily four factors the FTC announced it will
examine in the proposed study:
[1] actual wholesale prices (including rebates, discounts,
etc.) for brand-name and generic drugs, both with and
without competition from authorized generics; [2] business
reasons (including profitability assessments) that support
authorized generic entry; [3] factors (including product
development and litigation costs) relevant to the decisions
of generic firms about whether and under what
circumstances to seek entry prior to patent expiration; and
[4] licensing agreements with authorized generics. 82
To analyze these factors, information will be sought from
approximately 80 brand-name manufacturers, 10 authorized generic
companies, and 100 independent generic manufacturers. 83 The study
proposed to examine drug information for every NDA product that
received an ANDA notification since January 1, 1999, as well as the
corresponding ANDA data.
84
The notice provided a very lengthy and detailed description of
the information that the FTC plans to request from pharmaceutical
manufacturers in order to evaluate these factors. In brief, the
information requested is as follows:
a) detailed sales, cost, and price information for NDA
products, including authorized generics, and the
corresponding ANDA product;
b) any documents dated after January 1, 1998 prepared or
received by any senior officer concerning generic
competition, generic entry, patent expiration, and license
agreements;
c) IMS Health Data, if obtained in the regular course of
business.
85
In order to obtain the relevant data, the FTC will issue special
orders pursuant to Section 6(b) of the FTC Act 86 to the brand-name,
82 First Notice, supra note 1, at 16780 (emphasis added).
3 Id. at 16781.
84 id.
85 Id. at 16781-82; See also, Roberti, supra note 9, at 22. IMS Health is the world's
leading provider of information, research, and analysis to the pharmaceutical industry.
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generic, and authorized generic companies. 87 The FTC economists and
lawyers will then analyze the data and begin to reach preliminary
conclusions-such as recommending legislation or enforcement
actions, or finding no harm. However, before requesting any data, the
FTC invited any interested party to submit comments on the proposed
study.8 9
A. First Request for Comments
In response to the FTC's request for comments, 13
commentators submitted written statements. Generally speaking, most
of the comments agreed with the practical utility of the study;
90
however, one commentator, speaking on behalf of an undisclosed
client, argued that the recent enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act
could sufficiently change the incentives to market authorized generics,
rending the study virtually moot.
91
86 See 15 U.S.C.A 46(b) (Supp. 2007).
87 First Notice, supra note 1, at 16780.
88 See, Roberti, supra note 9, at 22.
89 First Notice, supra note 1, at 16779.
90 See e.g., GPhA I, supra note 8, at 1 (stating that GPhA "commend[s] the FTC's
decision to issue the Study"); PhRMA Comments On Proposed Information Requests
2 (June 5, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/genericdrugstudy3/O60605pharma.pdf [hereinafter
PhRMA I] (noting that the study "should enhance public understanding of how
authorized generics impact consumers"); Letter from Alex Sugerman-Brozan,
Director, Prescription Access Litigation Project, to Office of the Secretary, Federal
Trade Commission 6 (June 5, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/genericdrugstudy3/060605pal.pdf [hereinafter PAL]
(stating that the "information will be particularly useful as a tool for Congress to
make an informed decision on whether further legislation needs to be adopted
surrounding the marketing of authorized generics").
91 Comments on Proposed Information and Document Requests, Authorized Generic
Drug Study, submitted by Ronald W. Davis 2 (June 4, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/genericdrugstudy3/O60604davis.pdf [hereinafter
Davis]. Although Section 6003 of the Deficit Reduction Act ("DRA") did not
specifically address authorized generics, the legislation requires a manufacturer that
"approves, allows, or otherwise permits any drug of the manufacturer to be sold under
a new drug application approved under 505(c) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act," to include all such drugs in the manufacturer's average
manufacturer's price [AMP] and best price, a requirement that includes authorized
generics. Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006) (amending Section 1927(b)(3)(A)
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396r-8(b)(3)(A)). Thus, DRA requires that
authorized generics be included when calculating AMP and best price for Medicaid
rebates. According to Davis, the effect of DRA will "fundamentally reduce the
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While agreeing with the overall utility, commentators,
representing both brand-name and generic manufacturers, as well as
public interest groups, offered various suggestions on the scope of the
information requested. Specifically, recommendations were made to
limit the time period covered,92 reduce the number of drugs,93 and focus
document request on those relating to authorized generics. 94 Also, an
unnamed generic manufacturer urged the FTC to specifically request
pricing information of drugs at the retail level.
95
Most notably about the comments received, though, were the
differing views of the brand-name and generic manufacturers about the
primary source of information. Brand-name manufacturers, through
their organization Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America ("PhRMA"), expressed support of the use of quantitative data,
rather than qualitative documents requests, to determine the effects on
consumers. PhRMA asserted that pricing data and output data "will
show most clearly and directly whether authorized generics have
benefited consumers by increasing availability of prescription drugs at
lower prices.' ' 96  Furthermore, documents relating to brand-name
manufacturers subjective future plans are not well suited to assess the
incentives of branded firms to introduce authorized generics." Davis, supra note 91,
at 3. There may be some support for this argument. See Christopher Stromberg, Will
Medicaid Reform Affect Brand-Name Manufacturers' Choices to Market Authorized
Generic Versions of Their Drugs, 20 ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRONICLE 2 ( 2006)
(providing an in depth analysis of possible effects of DRA and its impact on the
economic viability of authorized generics). The FTC though, found that the inclusion
of authorized generics in the best price calculation is unlikely to decrease revenues for
authorized generics in most cases. Agency Information Collection Activities;
Comment Request, 72 Fed. Reg. 25304, 25308-10 (May 4, 2007) [hereinafter Second
Notice].
92 See GPhA 1, supra note 8, at 4 n. 5; Letter from William M. Rubenstein, Actavis
Group, to Office of the Secretary, Federal Trade Commission 2 (June 5, 2006)
available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/genericdrugstudy3/060605actavisgroup.pdf
[hereinafter Actavis].
93 See Actavis, supra note 92, at 2-3; Davis, supra note XX, at 91.
94 See PhRMA I, supra note 90, at 8; Actavis, supra note 92, at 2-3.
95 Letter from Tim Gilbert, Gilbert's LLP, to Office of the Secretary, Federal Trade
Commission 3 (June 5, 2006) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/genericdrugstudy3/O60605gilberts.pdf. As noted
above, the study had only requested pricing information on the wholesale level. The
difference between the two types of pricing data becomes especially important in
performing an economic analysis of the impact of authorized generics. See, infra Part
IV.B.
96 PhRMA I, supra note 90, at 2-3.
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impact of authorized generics on the market and "are of little utility for
a long-term empirical study."97 The support for quantitative data was
further reiterated by Eli Lilly and Company.
98
Generic manufacturers (and some public interest groups), on the
other hand, stressed the importance of, and need for, qualitative
information. The evaluative decision concerning generic entry with
Paragraph IV filings is typically a three-to-seven year proposition. 99 As
authorized generics only began to resurface around 2003, the decision
to market a generic was made before authorized generics became so
prevalent. 100 Thus, GPhA argues, the quantitative data requested will
not fully demonstrate the effects that authorized generics have on
generic entry.1°1 While recognizing the usefulness the quantitative
data, GPhA stressed the need for evidence of the decision-making
processes of both generic and brand-name manufacturers.'
2
B. Second Request for Comments
In response to the submitted comments, the FTC amended the
study and issued a second notice and request for further comments.
The FTC accepted the numerous recommendations to limit the scope;
specifically, they reduced the number of drugs and time period covered
and focused the document request on those relating to authorized
97 1d. at3.
98 Letter from Robert A. Armitage, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Eli
Lilly and Company, to Office of the Secretary, Federal Trade Commission I (June 5,
2006) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/genericdrugstudy3/0606051illy.pdf (hereinafter
Lilly] (supporting the comments of PhRMA as to the need to tailor the information
requests to the objectives of the study).
99 GPhA I, supra note 8, at 4.
100 Id.
10' Id.; see also, Letter from David A. Balto, on behalf of the American Antitrust
Institute, Consumer Federation of America, Families USA, and US PIRG, to Donald
S. Clark, Secretary, Federal Trade Commission 6 (June 6, 2006) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/genericdrugstudy3/060606balto.pdf [hereinafter
Balto] ("Authorized generics began only 2 years ago. Since the decision by a generic
firm to enter is typically made several years before entry, the more significant long-
term effects will not be identified by current quantitative data.").
102 GPhA I, supra note 8, at 4-5. In addition to stressing the importance of qualitative
data, GPhA and other commentators suggested that the FTC hold hearings to gain
more insight into the decision-making process and to evaluate the long-term
competitive effects of authorized generics. Id. at 6-7; Balto, supra note 101, at 6;
PAL, supra note 90, at 6.
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generics.l°3 Notably, the FTC accepted the invitation to request pricing
data at the retail level, in addition to the previously requested wholesale
data.' 0 4 However, the FTC declined to evaluate authorized generics, in
conjunction with other possible strategies brand-name manufacturers
might use to adversely affect generic competition, as an expansive
strategy to delay generic entry.
10 5
The FTC expressed the need for both quantitative and
qualitative data to fully analyze the short- and long-term competitive
effects of authorized generics on the pharmaceutical marketplace.
10 6
Of the quantitative data that the FTC is seeking, price data will likely
show the short-term effects on consumers, whereas data on sales,
market share, and return on investment are more significant in
evaluating the long-term effects of authorized generics on generic
manufacturers' incentives to file ANDAs and challenge patents.107 The
number of recent filings of Paragraph IV certifications should also be
relevant to the long-term effects. 10 8  However, the FTC noted,
qualitative information is also essential to assess the long-term impact
of authorized generics on generic manufacturers' decisions to file
Paragraph IV certifications. 10 9 Generic manufacturer documents are
necessary to understand how authorized generics actually affect generic
manufacturers' decision-making. 110 According to the FTC, brand-name
manufacturer documents could "further elucidate the likely effects of
authorized generics on generic company decisions to challenge patents,
and aid in the interpretation of the quantitative data."
111
One of the previous commentators, PhRMA, responded to the
Second Notice, primarily asserting their arguments in opposition to the
practical utility of document requests. PhRMA reiterated its previous
position that the study should focus on quantitative data and that brand-
name company documents will not be of any practical utility to the
103 Second Notice, supra note 91, at 25308-10.
104 Id. at 25311. In order to evaluate the retail level prices, the FTC will obtain the
data directly from IMS. Id.
105 Id. at 25312.
106 Id. at 25310.
107 id.
'08 Second Notice, supra note 91, at 25310. The diminishing number of brand
products available for Paragraph IV challenges will also be taken into account when
analyzing the current trends in Paragraph IV filings. Id. at 25312.
Id. at 25310.
11 Id. at 25311. The generic company documents requested will be those prepared
before the First Notice for this study was published. Id. at 25310.
...ld. at 25311.
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study. 112  The brand-name company documents about generic entry
decisions are "pure speculation" and will not "reliably show whether
generic drug company entry has become unprofitable as a result of
authorized generics."'"1
3
GPhA and Gilbert's, representing a generic manufacturer, also
each submitted a second set of comments about the study, primarily
arguing generally against the practice of authorized generics. GPhA
asserted that most authorized generic licensing agreements provide that
the authorized generic may not be marketed until after a generic has
been approved (i.e. during the exclusivity period)."14  According to
Gilbert's, when authorized generics are permitted, brand-name
manufacturers are essentially being rewarded for invalid or non-
infringed patents during the exclusivity period, because the brand-name
manufacturer prevents generic entry and competition and benefits from
inappropriate monopoly prices." 5  Thus, GPhA argues, brand-name
firms are intentionally diminishing generic incentives and therefore
"more brand-name patents will go unchallenged (because the value of
the diluted exclusivity makes patent challenges less cost effective),
generic competition will be diminished, and consumers will be denied
lower-cost generic drugs."' 6
In addition to asserting arguments against authorized generics,
GPhA detailed the level of involvement of generic manufacturers in the
pharmaceutical industry. Generic drugs account for over 56% percent
of all prescriptions filed. 117 Much of this generic entry is likely the
112 Letter from Michael Cowie, Howrey LLP, on behalf of PhRMA, to Office of the
Secretary, Federal Trade Commission 4-9 (June 4, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/genericdrugstudy3/529613-00003.pdf [hereinafter
PhRMA II].
..
3 Id. at 6-8.
114 Letter from Kathleen Jaeger, President & CEO, Generic Pharmaceutical
Association, to Office of the Secretary, Federal Trade Commission 3 (August 22,
2007) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/genericdrugstudy3/529613-
00005.pdf [hereinafter GPhA II].
115 Letter from Tim Gilbert, Gilbert's LLP, to Office of the Secretary, Federal Trade
Commission 2 (June 4, 2007) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/genericdrugstudy3/529613-00004.pdf [hereinafter
Gilbert's II] (asserting that while the brand-name manufacturer is being rewarded, the
generic manufacturer is being punished for exposing the invalid patent).
116 GPhA II, supra note 114, at 3.
117 Id. at 2. GPhA reported on their website that generics account for 63 percent of all
prescriptions dispensed. GPhA Statistics,
http://www.gphaonline.org/Content!NavigationMenu/AboutGenerics/Statistics/defaul
t.htm.
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result of the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Furthermore, an
estimated $78 billion in pharmaceutical sales are expected to go off-
patent in the next few years." 8 Thus, GPhA argues, generics play a
significant role in health care savings. 11
9
C. Concluding Observations
Based on commentator's suggestions and the FTC responses,
certain conclusions can be drawn regarding the factors to be used in
evaluating the effects of authorized generics. The business decisions of
both brand-name and generic manufacturers are important in
determining the reasons for both generic and authorized generic
entry. 12  Company documents from the manufacturers will primarily
be used in evaluating this factor. Secondly, the short-term effects on
consumers must be determined using both wholesale and retail pricing
data.12 1  Finally, sales, market share, and return on investment data
must be analyzed to determine the long-term competitive impact of
authorized generics.
118 See GPhAII, supra 114, at 2.
119 Id.
120 For generic entry, this also includes an assessment of "whether and to what extent
consumers benefit from the accelerated generic entry due to patent challenges;
whether 180-day exclusivity undermines those benefits by delaying competition; and
whether 180-day exclusivity is a necessary incentive for generic companies to
undertake patent challenges." Second Notice, supra note 91, at 25312. An evaluation
of the exclusivity period is especially important when analyzing the alleged reduction
in generic incentives. Authorized generic entry will also be compared and contrasted
with shared exclusivity. Id.
121 It is unclear which, if any, of the pricing data will be more heavily weighted.
Interestingly, in the First Notice, the FTC only requested wholesale prices. It is also
the position of a PhRMA supported study that economists, including the FTC, prefer
the use of wholesale prices in determining competitive effects. See infra note 144 and
accompanying text.
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IV. COMPETITIVE IMPACT-A QUALITATIVE AND
QUANTITATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS 122
This Note has previously established the factors needed to
evaluate the likely impact of authorized generics. This Section begins
by analyzing the reasons for generic and authorized generic entry,
particularly analyzing the role that exclusivity plays in generic entry.
The analysis proceeds with an examination of these factors, using
previous economic studies to demonstrate the likely effects of
authorized generics on consumers. As the FTC noted, there is no
comprehensive economic study on authorized generics; however,
current studies provide an insight into the likely impact of the practice
on consumers.
A. Generic and Authorized Generic Entry
1. Generic Entry and Exclusivity
Generic manufactures have argued that authorized generics
decrease the incentives to file ANDAs. Their primary assertion is that
the introduction of authorized generics reduces the value of the
exclusivity period. The underlying assumption of such an argument is
that the exclusivity period is the primary, and necessary, incentive for
generic entry. Thus, an evaluation of generic manufacturers' entry
decisions would not be complete without an analysis of the degree of
incentive of the 180-day exclusivity period and how it factors into the
generic entry decision-making process. This was the view expressed
by Eli Lilly and Co. and adopted by the FTC in their study. 123 It has
even been suggested that the 180-day exclusivity period is unnecessary
as an incentive to induce generic entry and thus may even harm
consumers in some situations. 124 The FDA often sees as many as five
122 It is the goal of this Section to provide more of a summary of the differing
economic studies on authorized generics, rather than a through dissecting and analysis
of the studies. However, this Section will "analyze" the economic studies in light of
the comments to the FTC study, and the subsequent responses. In doing so, it is the
aim of this section to determine the likely competitive impact of authorized generics
on the pharmaceutical market, particular the impact on consumers.
123 See Lilly, supra note 98, at 2; Second Notice, supra note 91, at 25312.
124 See Jeremiah Helm, The Patent End Game: Evaluating Generic Entry into a
Blockbuster Pharmaceutical Marketplace in the Absence of FDA Incentives, 14
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 175 (2007). In reaching the conclusion that the
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ANDAs for a single drug, even without the prospect of the exclusivity
period. 125 Furthermore, there is also the possibility that the exclusivity
period will be "shared" with other manufacturers, thus increasing the
likelihood that multiple generics will be awarded the exclusivity
period. 126  If multiple ANDAs are still being filed, and risking the
likelihood of an expensive patent infringement suit without the
possibility of exclusivity as an incentive, how can authorized generics
really affect the decision of a generic to enter the market? 127  These
arguments are not meant to suggest that the exclusivity period should
be eliminated, as there are clear benefits to the exclusivity period,
particularly in smaller market drugs when fewer ANDAs are likely to
be filed. However, the incentive of exclusivity is not the primary factor
in generic entry and likely plays a smaller role in generic decision-
making than many commentators assume.
So if the exclusivity period is not the primary reason, or maybe
not even a large factor, in the decision-making process, why do
generics enter the market? First and foremost, it goes without saying,
that the pharmaceutical market, including generics, is profitable. As
GPhA has noted, generic drugs account for approximately 63 percent of
all pharmaceuticals and over $78 billion in pharmaceutical sales will go
off patent in the coming years. Many consumers, and their insurers,
prefer the lower cost generics to costly brand-name drugs. 128 Thus,there is clearly a profitable market to enter.
exclusivity period is unnecessary for blockbuster drugs, the author examined the
Prescription sales data for only one drug. Id. at 176.25 Coe & Morse, supra note 6, at 2. The authors likely even underestimated the
number of ANDA filers for many drugs. The FDA often sees as many as fourteen
generic manufacturers enter the market. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center
for Drug Evaluation and Approvals, First-Time Generics - April 2007,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/approvals/1 stgen0407.htm (approving fourteen
applications to market generic versions of Ambien CRTM (Zolpidem)).
126 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Marketing an authorized generic during
the exclusivity period is no different than the "shared exclusivity" between multiple
generic manufacturers. If generics manufacturers are willing to file with the
likelihood that exclusivity will be shared with another generic, then so too are they
likely to file when an authorized generic is anticipated.
127 See Jerry Swindel, Senior Counsel, Johnson & Johnson, Whose Drug Is It
Anyway? Authorized Generics, Their Role In The Pharmaceutical Marketplace, And
The FTC Study, Address Before the Intellectual Property, Healthcare and Federal
Civil Enforcement Committees of the American Bar Association's Antirust Section
(Sept. 14, 2006).
128 According to GPhA, the average generic prescription drug cost $28.71, compared
to $95.54 for the branded version. GPhA II, supra note 114, at 2.
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One of the primary incentives, and reasons for generic entry, is
the ANDA application created under the Hatch-Waxman Act.129 Prior
to enactment, a generic manufacturer was required to conduct clinical
trials to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of the drug and file its own
NDA. Conducting the clinical trials and demonstrating the safety and
efficacy of the drug is a lengthy, expensive process, consuming years
and hundreds of millions of dollars. A study conducted in 2003
estimated an average out-of-pocket clinical period cost per approved
new drug to be US$ 282 million with a capitalized cost of US$ 467
million. 13  As a result of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the generic
manufacturers need only demonstrate bioequivalence, rather than
duplicate these costly clinical trials. While the cost to demonstrate
bioequivalence is not insignificant, it is much less expensive than NDA
clinical trials, with cost estimates for preparing and submitting an
ANDA ranging from US$ 300,000 to US$ 1 million. 31  By
establishing the ANDA process, the Hatch-Waxman Act decreased a
major barrier to generic entry-cost-and increased the incentives for
generic manufacturers.
129 The Congressional Budget Office noted two other factors driving generic entry,
namely: (1) "states had passed drug-product substitution laws that allowed
pharmacists to dispense a generic drug even when the prescription called for a brand-
name drug;" and (2) "government health programs, such as Medicaid, and many
private health insurance plans have actively promoting such generic substitution."
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1998)
[hereinafter CBO Study] available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf.
130 Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen, Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151,
165 (2003). The study surveyed the research and development cost of 68 randomly
selected new drugs to determine the average costs in 2000 dollars. Id. at 151. The
capitalized cost took into account the timing of investment and returns. Id. at 160.
The authors inferred from the out-of-pocket and capitalized clinical cost per new
approved drug that the preclinical cost would be US$ 121 and 335 million,
respectively. Id. at 166. Summing the preclinical and clinical cost estimates, the total
out-of-pocket cost per approved new drug was found to be US$ 403 million, with a
fully capitalized cost of US$ 802 million. Id.
131 Requirements for Submission of In Vivo Bioequivalence Data; Proposed Rule, 68
Fed. Reg. 61,640, 61,645 (Oct. 29, 2003); See also David Reiffen & Michael R.
Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REv. ECON. & STAT. 37, 38 (2005)
[hereinafter Reiffen & Ward I] (estimating the cost of applying for an ANDA,
including bioequivalency testing, to be approximately $603,000 in the early 1990s).
[VOL.12.1:159
2009] DR. STRANGE DRUG 183
2. Authorized Generic Entry
In evaluating the reasons for the marketing of authorized
generics, it is important to note a few important statistics about the
generic pharmaceutical industry. As noted above, generics account for
about 63 percent of all pharmaceuticals dispensed in the United States.
This translates into sales of $58.5 billion.1 32 In recent years, the generic
pharmaceutical industry has been growing at rates between 10 percent
and 50 percent. 133 When these generics enter the market, brand-name
drug sales drop by as much as 80-90 percent in a matter of weeks,
adversely affecting the brand-name manufacturers' profits.'
1 34
So why do brand-name manufacturers market authorized
generics? In the words of a representative of a brand-name
manufacturer: "Because its profitable." 135 As a way to retain some of
the 80 to 90 percent in lost profits, brand-name manufacturers introduce
authorized generics. In addition, brand-name manufacturers have spent
a considerable amount of time and money for the research and
development of these drugs. Authorized generics act as a means to
utilize the excess capacity resulting from their investment and continue
the income stream. 16 Thus, authorized generics are particularly likely
to be introduced in markets with large sales revenue, when the profits
are the greatest.
By allowing brand-name firms to continue their revenue stream
and utilize their excess capacity, authorized generics increase the
incentives to innovate. As a matter of policy, such efforts should be
encouraged. For example, a brand-name firm may invest as much as
$800 million into developing an innovator drug. Many times, a
monopoly is awarded, by means of patent protection, enabling the
brand-name manufacturer to recoup their investment. However, if the
patent on that drug is found invalid or non-infringed, and a generic
enters the market, the brand-name manufacturer may lose a large
percent of its pre-generic entry profits. With the authorized generic, the
132 Generic Pharmaceutical Association Statistics,supra note 117. Although the
brand-name sales account for about four times as much the generic market, $58.5
billion represents a very large market.
133 See Fred Gebhart, Generic pharmaceutical industry growth slows a tad, Drug
Topics (Apr. 1, 2005),
http://www.drugtopics.com/drugtopics/article/articleDetail.jsp?id = 152727.
134 Saaini Zain, Sword or Shield? An Overview and Competitive Analysis of the
Marketing of "Authorized Generics ", 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 739 (2007).
135 Swindel, supra note 127.
136 id.
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brand-name manufacturer is able to retain an income stream, a return
on their large investment, and compete with generic entry. Because
Paragraph IV certifications have been increasing rapidly in recent
years, brand-name manufacturers may be fearful of abruptly losing
profits on these innovator drugs. Authorized generics help quell these
concerns and encourage innovation. Furthermore, as discussed below,
the introduction of the authorized generic lowers prices for consumers
during the exclusivity period.
B. Short-Term Effects
It is a fundamental principle of economics that increasing
competition leads to lower prices. This was one of the goals driving
the enactment of Hatch-Waxman: consumer access to affordable drugs
by increased competition. It thus seems axiomatic that increasing
competition with the introduction of authorized generics during a
period of generic exclusivity will lead to lower generic drug prices in
the short-term.
Two recent empirical studies, though, using the same market
and data sets, reached different conclusions on the short-term effects of
authorized generics on pharmaceutical prices. Both studies employed
the same basic methodology: analyzing nine drug data sets, the average
discount between brand-name and generic drugs in which there was
authorized generic competition during the exclusivity period was
compared to the average discount between brand-name and generic
drugs for which there was no authorized generic. 137 Ultimately, this
comparison would be used to determine the effects of authorized
generics on pharmaceutical pricing. As noted above, though, the two
studies reached conflicting conclusions.
Using wholesale prices, the IMS study found as follows: when
an authorized generic was present during the exclusivity period, the
137 See IMS Consulting, Assessment of Authorized Generics in the U.S. 6-7 (Spring
2006) available at
http://www.phrma.org/files/IMS%2OAuthorized%2OGenerics%2OReport_6-22-
06.pdf; Aidan Hollis & Bryan A. Liang, An Assessment of the Effect of Authorized
Generics on Consumer Prices 9 (July 31, 2006) available at
http://www.gphaonline.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/Cont
entDisplay.cfm&ContentlD-2647. The conflicting findings are not surprising as the
IMS study was sponsored by PhRMA and the second study was sponsored by GPhA.
The GPhA study was conducted by Aidan Hollis, Associate Professor of Economics
at the University of Calgary, and Bryan Liang, Executive Director & Professor of
Law at California Western School of Law. Id.
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average discount between generic and brand was 38.8 percent; when an
authorized generic was not present, however, the average discount was
only 23.0 percent. 138 Comparing the two scenarios, the average
wholesale discount between generic and brand was 15.8 percent greater
in the scenarios when an authorized generic was present. 139 Using
retail prices, the Hollis & Liang study, on the other hand, found as
follows: with an authorized generic marketed during the exclusivity
period, the price discount for generic products averaged 20 percent over
the pre-entry brand price; when an authorized generic was not present,
the average discount was found to be 15 percent. 140  Thus, the
difference between discounts in the authorized generic sample and the
no-authorized generic sample was found to be 5 percent. 141  The
discounts found in the IMS study are much larger than those of the
Hollis & Liang study (16.8 percent compared to 5 percent). According
to Hollis & Liang, one of the primary reasons for these divergent
findings is IMS's use of wholesale level price data. 142
A subsequent study led by Howrey LLP antitrust partner Mike
Cowie and CapAnalysis economist Oliver Grawe (and supported by
PhRMA) substantiates the previous IMS study and refutes the findings
of Hollis & Liang.143 Cowie & Grawe provide an extensive defense of
the IMS's use of wholesale prices and criticism of retail prices. They
138 IMS Consulting, supra note 137, at 9-10. Wholesale prices are the costs to outlets
such as pharmacies and hospitals and were used to determine savings at any level of
the drug distribution channel (i.e. "savings to the healthcare system"). Id. at 7 n. 5.39 Id. at 11.
140 Hollis & Liang, supra note 137, at 12-14.
141 Id. at 14. Hollis & Liang also calculated a volume-weighted average discount and
found that the impact on price appeared to be approximately zero. Id. In another
study, Professor Hollis also concluded that in the Canadian market "pseudo-generics"
increase prices of both generic and brand-name drugs. Aidan Hollis, How do Brands'
"Own Generics" Affect Pharmaceutical Prices?, 27 REv. INDUS. ORG. 329, 346-348
(2005). However, because the Canadian pharmaceutical market and its regulations
are very different from the United States, it is not likely to provide much guidance for
the U.S. pharmaceutical market.
142 Hollis & Liang, supra note 137 at 15. According to Hollis & Liang, the retail level
prices used reflect the "price[s] consumers face." Id at 5. They also asserted a
number of other criticisms of the IMS study, including the following: comparison of
brand to generic prices at a given time and use of simple rather than weighted
averages. Id. at 15.
143 Mike Cowie & Oliver Grawe, Authorized Generics Benefit Consumers By
Reducing Prices: A Reply to Hollis & Liang (Mar. 14, 2007) available at
http://www.howrey.com/files/News/29b5c3ee-6dd3-480f-9c42-
c2dd 170f7e94/Presentation/NewsAttachment/0e5f5d06-0649-453a-8784-
efe59844cea 1/Authorized%20Generics%20Benefit%20Report.pdf.
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allege that the use of retail prices do not actually reflect the prices
consumers pay. 144  In reaching this conclusion, Cowie & Grawe
focused on the structure of the industry and Hollis & Liang's failure to
consider the role that insurance plans play in retail level pricing.
145
While a detailed description of the pharmaceutical industry and its
structure is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to note that
the structure of the pharmaceutical industry plays a vital role in
determining pricing and competition issues. 146  Thus, because of the
multifarious and multi-tiered aspects of the pharmaceutical industry,
data sets can easily be manipulated (with regards to price level) in order
to obtain the end result sought. Neither wholesale nor retail price
reduction directly results in lower consumer prices. Instead, both
wholesale and retail reductions result in savings to the drug distribution
network, which indirectly result in consumer savings. As a result, and
noted above, the FTC will investigate both wholesale and retail level
prices in order to determine the effects of authorized generics.
Regardless of which price level data set (wholesale or retail)
accurately measures consumer welfare, a comparison of the findings
leads to the conclusion that authorized generics result in short-term
generic price reductions between 5 and 17 percent. 47  FTC
144 Id. at 3. Furthermore, economists at both the Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Justice focus on manufacturer level prices, rather than retail. Id at 12-
14.
145 Id. at 3-9 (noting that about 85% of retail pharmacy transactions relate to
insurance plans and the study's failure to focus on expenditures borne by individuals).
Insured patients merely pay a co-pay regardless of the retail price. Specifically,
Cowie & Grawe allege that the retail level prices used by Hollis & Liang measured
total pharmacy reimbursement. Id. at 7. The large difference in price discounts
between wholesale and retail level seems to suggest problems may exist with the
distributional aspects of the pharmaceutical market. It has been suggested that when
analyzing the effects of authorized generics, the distributional and regulatory
concerns must be addressed. See Zain, supra note 134, at 760-75.
146 For an overview of the pharmaceutical industry and its structure, see In re
Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation, 230 F.R.D. 61 (D.
Mass. 2005); see also, Report of Independent Expert Professor Ernst R. Berndt to
Judge Patti B. Saris, In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price
Litigation, MDL-1456.No. 01-12257-PBS, 2005 WL 5533042 (D. Mass. Feb. 9,
2005).
147 Another independent study reviewed data on generic entry generally and
concluded that "authorized generics benefiting consumers of drugs sold during 180-
day exclusivity periods, by introducing additional competition that places downward
pressure on overall generic prices." Ernst R. Berndt, Richard Mortimer, Ashoke
Bhattacharjya, Andrew Parece, and Edward Tuttle, Authorized Generic Drugs, Price
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Commissioner Leibowitz has even publicly stated that authorized
generics likely benefit consumers in the short-term. Several other
studies, focusing though exclusivity on the generic market, have found
that the introduction of a second generic further reduces drug prices. 1
48
In addition, generic manufacturers themselves have brought actions
alleging that authorized generics have resulted in excessively low
prices for consumers. 149 Thus, in conclusion, authorized generics will
clearly benefit consumers in the short-term by lowering either retail or
wholesale prices for generic drugs during the 180-day exclusivity
period.
C. Long-Term Competitive Effects on Generic Manufacturers
Authorized generics are clearly taking profits from the generics,
but is this transfer of profits from one competitor to another competitor
a problem? This depends on whether or not authorized generics
decrease the incentives of the exclusivity period to such a degree that
they delay generic entry and harm consumers. Thus, much of the
controversy surrounding authorized generics turns on their likely
impact on future generic entry and pharmaceutical prices. Although
evaluations of their effects have been relatively limited, the available
studies demonstrate that authorized generics are unlikely to deter future
Paragraph IV filings and even if some filings are deterred, there will be
no net harm for the consumers.
Opponents argue that authorized generics, or the threat of,
reduce expected profits during the exclusivity period, which in turn
reduces the incentives to file Paragraph IV certifications. Because the
incentives are reduced, fewer Paragraph IV certifications will be filed,
generic entry will be delayed, 150 and consumers will pay higher prices.
Competition, And Consumers' Welfare: On balance, authorized generics are likely to
benefit consumers, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 790, 797 (2007) [hereinafter Bemdt I].
148 See, e.g., Reiffen & Ward I, supra note 131; CBO Study, supra note 129.
149 Cowie & Grawe, supra note 143, at 19; see also, supra note 9.
150 Generic entry may actually be accelerated in cases where the generic manufacturer
launches an "at-risk" strategy. Under this strategy, the generic manufacturer launches
the generic drug prior to resolution of the patent litigation and thus subjects itself to
triple damages. John Carreyrou & Joann S. Lublin, Emergency Room: How Bristol-
Myers Fumbled Defense of $4 Billion Drug, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2006, at Al. This
strategy was employed by Apotex when it launched an at-risk version of Plavix in
2006. Id. Thus, in some cases, the threat of authorized generics encourages generic
manufacturers to enter the market earlier. See Yana Pechersky, To Achieve Closure
of the Hatch- Waxman Act's Loopholes, Legislative Action is Unnecessary: Generic
Manufacturers Are Able to Hold Their Own, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 775
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Generic manufacturers, though, have acknowledged that it will be
difficult for any empirical study to demonstrate the impact of
authorized generics on long-term generic entry.'
51
The few economics studies that have been conducted thus far
reached slightly conflicting conclusions. A recent study conducted by
David Reiffen of the U.S. Commodity Future Trading Commission and
Michael R. Ward, Associate Professor of Economics at the University
of Texas, concluded that "the anticipation of [authorized] generic entry
in Paragraph IV cases can dramatically change the incentives of generic
firms, perhaps eliminating the incentive to litigate the validity of
patents in some cases."152 Using an economic mechanism based on an
indirect approach, Reiffen and Ward determined the effects of
authorized generic entry on generic prices after patent expiration.
153
Applying these results to Paragraph IV cases, the authors concluded the
following:
[P]rice changes resulting from [authorized] generics are
largest in relatively small markets. Conversely, the
estimates indicate that such introductions are least
problematic (from the standpoint of social welfare), but
most profitable in relatively large markets. As such,
government policy targeting [authorized] generic entry
(concluding that legislative action prohibiting authorized generics is unnecessary
because of generics use of at-risk launch strategies and other actions).
151 See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
152 David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, 'Branded Generics' as a Strategy to Limit
Cannibalization of Pharmaceutical Markets, 28 MANAGE. DECIS. ECON. 251, 262
(2007) (emphasis added) (hereinafter Reiffen & Ward II]; see also, Aidan Hollis, The
Anti-Competitive Effects of Brand-Controlled "Pseudo-Generics" in the Canadian
Pharmaceutical Market, 29 CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY - ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES 21
(2003) (concluding that the threat of "pseudo-generics" deters generic entry in smaller
markets). As the title implies, this study was conducted in the Canadian
pharmaceutical market, with deferring regulations, and thus has limited applicability
to the US market. While arguments such as these have been advanced in the past,
they have proven false. See Bryan A. Liang, The Anticompetitive Nature of Brand
Name Firm Introduction of Generics Before Patent Expiration, 41 ANTITRUST
BULLETIN 599, 634 (1996) (arguing in 1996 that change was needed "so that the
generics industry [would not be] overcome" by authorized generics).
153 Reiffen & Ward II, supra note 152, at 252-53. The impact of authorized generics
could not be measured directly because the decision to file an ANDA takes well prior
to patent expiration. Id. at 252. For the hypothetical small market, authorized generic
entry resulted in generic price increases between 1.6 percent and 2.7 percent,
depending on how high the switching costs. Id. at 260. For the larger markets, on the
other hand, the price increases ranged between 0.1 percent and 0.3 percent. Id.
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would be most appropriate if branded generic drugs were
most often introduced in small markets. 
154
Stated different, the size of the market will have a direct impact on both
the deterrent effect and profitability of authorized generics. In the case
of smaller markets, authorized generics are likely to be less profitable,
but generate greater long-term effects on generic entry. For larger
markets, though, authorized generics will generate greater profits for
brand-name manufacturers and be insufficient to increase generic
prices.
A previous study, while reaching some similar findings to
Reiffen and Ward, concluded overall that authorized generics are
unlikely to harm long-term prices. 155  For many drugs, the generic
profits are sufficient to recoup the cost of patent challenges and ANDA
expenses, even with authorized generics on the market. 156 Similar to
the Reiffen and Ward, Bemdt found the size of the market to be an
important factor when determining the effects of authorized generics.
For the larger markets, even if authorized generics may deter generic
entry, consumers are unlikely to be harmed because of the number of
generics willing to file Paragraph IV certifications. 157 Generally, drugs
with high pre-generic entry sales are more likely to have both
authorized generic entry and generic manufacturers filing Paragraph IV
certifications. 158 Furthermore, to the extent that generics are deterred,
154 Id. at 263.
155 See Berndt I, supra note 147. This study was conducted by the following: Ernst
Berndt, Professor in Applied Economics, Sloan School of Management,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and National Bureau of Economic Research;
Richard Mortimer, Vice President, Analysis Group; Ashoke Bhattacharjya, Executive
Director, Health Outcomes and Policy, Johnson and Johnson Medical; Andrew
Parece, Managing Principal, Analysis Group; and Edward Tuttle, Managing Principal,
Analysis Group. Id. Hereinafter the authors will be referred to as "Berndt."
156 Id. at 793. With an authorized generic on the market, a generic firm with 180-day
exclusivity is still likely to realize a 470 percent return on investment. FDA News,
Pharma Analyst: Authorized Generics Here to Stay, 21 GENERIC LiNE 24 (Dec. 14,
2004).
157 Berndt, supra note 147, at 793-94. Exclusivity is but one of the reasons for
generic entry and Paragraph IV certifications have continued to be filed despite many
other factors diminishing the value of exclusivity. Id. These factors include the
likelihood that exclusivity will be shared with other generics, competition to be the
first filer, and the possibility that the Paragraph IV application or litigation will be
unsuccessful. Id. See also, Section IV.A.I., supra, for factors affecting exclusivity
and decisions for generic entry.
158 In a second working paper, the same authors analyzed recent empirical data and
found that authorized generics typically enter in the high revenue drug markets. Ernst
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they will likely be in situations when the generic has the least
likelihood of success in prevailing in the patent challenge. 5 9 Thus,
while authorized generics may reduce the gains of generic
manufacturers during the 180-day exclusivity period, substantial
incentives for filing Paragraph IV certifications remain and consumer
welfare is unlikely to be harmed.
D. Conclusion
In determining the overall net impact of authorized generics on
consumer welfare, it is necessary to weigh the short-term benefits
against any long-term harms. Authorized generics provide consumers
with increased competition during the period of generic exclusivity,
reducing pharmaceutical prices. The price discount differs depending
on whether retail or wholesale prices are measured. Regardless,
though, consumer welfare is advanced, either through savings to the
healthcare network or through pharmacy reimbursements. This direct
evidence of savings should not be taken lightly when balancing with
the long-term impact. As noted by many commentators, an empirical
study of the long-term effects will have difficulty reaching a definitive
conclusion. The recent studies, though, suggest that for large market
drugs, when authorized generics are most likely to enter, independent
generics are unlikely to be deterred from entering the market. In the
smaller markets, the introduction of an authorized generic potentially
decreases the incentives of generic entry. However, these potential
harms are offset by the benefits of short-term price discounts.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES
With generic exclusivity as the primary concern expressed by
opponents of authorized generics, options are limited for possible
R. Berndt, Richard Mortimer, and Andrew Parece, Do Authorized Generic Drugs
Deter Paragraph IV Certifications? Recent Evidence 14-15 (Analysis Group,
Working Paper, 2007), available at
http://www.analysisgroup.com/analysisgroup/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articies/PhR
MA AuthorizedGenericEntry.pdf. The authors also found an increase in the rate
of Paragraph IV filings in recent years. Id. at 11.
159 Bemdt, supra note 147, at 794. Because this litigation is less likely to lead to
improved consumer access to generic drugs, any potential deterrence due to
authorized generics is unlikely to impact competition or consumer welfare. Thomas,
supra note 25, at 18.
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solutions. The generics manufacturers have, in the past, sought
Congressional action, discussed below; however, these bills failed to
pass in Congress. Commentators have also suggested other alternative
approaches. Having demonstrated that the only area of concern arises
in small market drugs, this Section will analyze these proposed
solutions and demonstrate the unintended consequences likely to result
should any of these proposed solutions be enacted.
A. Previously Proposed Legislation
An example of a possible "solution" to the alleged "problem" of
authorized generics can be seen in previously proposed legislation. On
January 30, 2007, members of the Senate introduced the "Fair
Prescription Drug Competition Act" to restrict the marketing of
authorized generics.1 60 According to Senator Rockefeller, authorized
generics "shut[] true generics out of the market, limit[] consumer
choice and eliminate[] billions of dollars in prescription drug savings
for people.., across the country."' 161 The bill would have amended the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to provide that an NDA may not
"manufacture, market, sell, or distribute an authorized generic drug,
direct or indirectly, or authorize any other person to manufacture,
market, sell, or distribute an authorized generic drug." 162 Thus, the bill
would have made the practice of authorized generics per se illegal,
even during periods of non-exclusivity.
Because the opponents of authorized generics are primarily
concerned with their effects on Paragraph IV certifications and generic
incentives (namely, the exclusivity period), such a broad, over-
inclusive bar on authorized generics would clearly have unintended
consequences. Upon expiration of the exclusivity period, there has
been no disagreement that authorized generics would increase price
competition in the generic marketplace. In a sense, the authorized
generics would be acting merely as another generic. The same can also
be said of the beneficial effects of authorized generics upon patent
expiration, when there is no generic exclusivity. Thus, even if one
160 S. 438, 110th Cong. (2007). The bill was introduced by Senators Rockefeller (D-
WV), Schumer (D-NY), Kohl (D-WI), and Leahy (D-VT).
161 Statement of Senator Rockefeller, "Rockefeller Fights for Consumers' Access to
Affordable Prescription Drugs" (January 31, 2007) available at
http://rockefeller.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=281544&
162 S. 438, 110th Cong. (2007). Members of the House of Representatives, Emerson,
Berry, Wamp, and Moore, introduced an identical bill into the House on February 5,
2007. See H.R. 806, 110th Cong. (2007).
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assumes, for the sake of argument, that authorized generics deter
generic entry during the exclusivity, a complete prohibition would
place a ban on authorized generics during periods that offer unarguable
consumer benefits.
B. Other Possible Solutions
Given the commentators concerns over exclusivity (and the
economic data suggesting a potential concern in small markets), the
most obvious solution would be to bar authorized generics during the
exclusivity period. To achieve this end, Congress could amend Hatch-
Waxman to prohibit the marketing of authorized generics during the
180-day exclusivity period. 63 However, by doing so, Congress would
harm consumer welfare. During the 180-day exclusivity period, a
single generic entrant essentially operates as a monopoly in the generic
market. With the introduction of an authorized generic, the generic
manufacturer is faced with competition and forced to lower its price.
As a result of this increased competition, pharmaceutical prices are
lowered. Opponents of authorized generics rationalize a ban because of
the potential deterrent effect in low volume markets. However, by
eliminating this potential harm to low market pharmaceuticals,
Congress would be denying consumers the clear price benefits of
authorized generics seen in the majority of drugs.
Altering the Hatch-Waxman balance by prohibiting authorized
generics during the exclusivity period reduces brand-name
manufacturers' profits and the incentives for new drug development as
well. 164 Generic drug entry, particularly during exclusivity, drastically
reduces brand-name sales. Brand-name manufacturers must match this
competition and they do so with the entry of authorized generics.
Placing a restriction on authorized generics would force brand-name
manufacturers to find other ways to compete with generics. They may
choose to lower the price of the brand-name drug, which in turn may
again decrease the incentives of generic entry. Would opponents then
petition Congress to prohibit brand-name manufacturers from lowering
their prices during the exclusivity period? By eliminating the brand-
name manufacturers' introduction of a lower priced alternative,
Congress would be walking a slippery slope.
163 See Chen, supra note 9, at 5 11 (concluding that a ban during the exclusivity period
would eliminate authorized generics as an anticompetitive strategy and ensure an
adequate reward for Paragraph IV litigation).
164 Coe & Morse, supra note 6, at 3.
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Another possible area of reform involves the use of authorized
generics in the context of settlement, when brand-name manufacturers
promise to forgo introducing an authorized generic in exchange for the
first-filer agreeing to push back its entry date.165 In such cases, there
may be a violation of the antitrust laws1 66 and it may be appropriate to
prohibit the use of authorized generics in the context of litigation
settlement. The implication of this proposal and its legality, though, is
beyond the scope of this article and is more in line with the controversy
surrounding the so-called "reverse payment settlements."'
' 67
CONCLUSION
Authorized generics operate within the delicate balance of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. Courts have thus far upheld their legality because
they promote competition in furtherance of fundamental Hatch-
Waxman objectives. Economic studies suggest consumers benefit with
price discounts in the short-term.
Given the clear benefits resulting from authorized generics,
Congress should restrain from placing any restrictions on the practice.
In many ways, authorized generics represent the best of both worlds of
the Hatch-Waxman balance: lower priced generic drugs and rewarding
innovative efforts. Because authorized generics reduce short-term
prices of pharmaceuticals, their introduction is very valuable to
consumer access to affordable drugs. Significant incentives remain to
encourage generic manufacturers to enter the market. Authorized
generics also reward the innovative efforts of brand-name
manufacturers following generic entry by allowing them to continue a
declining revenue stream and utilizing excess capacity. Removing this
165 See Gilbert's II, supra note 115, at 4.
166 See Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Exclusion Payments to Settle
Pharmaceutical Patent Cases: They're B-a-a-a-ck! (The Role of the Commission,
Congress, and the Courts), Remarks at the Second Annual In-House Counsel's Forum
on Pharmaceutical Antitrust (Apr. 24, 2006) ("[S]uch settlements may raise
interesting questions regarding whether accepting delay in exchange for an assurance
from the brand that the generic can enjoy its exclusivity period - without fear of
competing with an authorized generic - constitutes a violation of the FTC Act.").
167 These have been analyzed by multiple courts and numerous commentators. See
e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006); Schering-
Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (1 1th Cir. 2005); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.,
332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Settlement
Payments Violate the Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 489 (2007); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlement As a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1553 (2006).
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reward for innovation would deny consumers access to a lower cost
alternative and lead to new attempts to compete in the generic market.
JOHN M. REBMAN
